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COMMENT
Human Rights in Iran Under the Shah
by Professor Richard W. Cottam*
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR ANY ADVOCATE of human rights, the events surrounding the
Iranian revolution must be a source of continuing agony. But for any-
one interested in gaining a sharper understanding of some of the basic
issues concerning human rights, the dramatic developments in Iran
should be highly instructive. The early summary executions in Iran and
the later public trials conducted by revolutionary Islamic courts were
properly condemned by western human rights advocates as failing to ap-
proach the requirements of due process. Yet the great majority of those
who were tried and executed were charged with terrible violations of the
most elemental human rights; and the testimony of the accused, so rich in
detail and so internally consistent as to be credible,1 tends to confirm the
worst charges against the Shah's regime. The testimony also points to
both direct and indirect complicity of western governments, particularly
the United States and Israel, in constructing the Shah's instruments for
administering terror.2
Spokesmen for the Shah's regime argued that Iran was moving with
optimal speed toward a society in which the more exquisite manifesta-
tions of human rights-those concerned with individual and political
freedom-would be accommodated. But before this stage could be
reached, they insisted that more basic human needs had to be addressed
and the Iranian people educated to the point that they could understand
and support a free political system. After all, the argument always goes,
Iranians have no tradition of freedom. 3 This view found easy acceptance
in the West. But was such a tutorial period necessary? Were the Shah
and his western supporters in fact rendering this tutorial service? And
what are the prospects for an observance of human rights in its varied
manifestations in Iran today?
* Professor of Political Science, The University of Pittsburgh. B.A. (1948), University
of Utah; M.A. (1952), Harvard University;, Ph.D. (1954), Harvard University.
1 The testimony of the accused is reported in full detail in the Tehran press.
'See the testimony of General Amir Hossein Rabii published in Ettelaat, Apr. 13, 1979.
3 Hoveyda, Not all Clocks for Human Rights are the Same, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1977,
at A25, col. 1.
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II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN IRAN IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
To address these questions sensibly the Iranian revolutionary move-
ment must be placed in a historical context. The lay reader of western
newspaper accounts of the revolution in Iran could hardly avoid the con-
clusion that the revolution was in essence anti-modernist. It was depicted
generally as the response of a traditional people led by an exotic, reac-
tionary, and vengeful religious leader against a regime that had tried to
modernize too rapidly. The Shah, we were told, had erred mainly in un-
derestimating the time required to tutor his "child-like" people into an
appreciation of modern values. In fact, the Iranian revolutionary move-
ment is a conglomerate of elements, none of which opposes rapid change,
but which have opposed the traditional order in Iran throughout the
twentieth century. However, the various elements differ sharply in the
particular direction they want the forces of change to follow; in other
words, they operate from different definitions of modernization. At the
heart of their philosophical differences lies the varied areas of emphasis
each places on the range of concerns concealed under the umbrella term
human rights.
A. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906
The success of the revolution in 1979 marked the third time in this
century that the revolutionary allies achieved power in Iran. The first
time was in 1906 when the so-called constitutional revolution forced
Mozaffar al-Din Shah to accept a constitution modeled on that of
Belgium. The revolutionary forces consisted basically of three elements.
There was first a group of secular intellectuals, many of whom were the
sons of the traditional aristocracy. These persons, whose influence is most
clearly reflected in the constitution of 1906, looked for inspiration to the
French Enlightenment. They were most concerned with the rights of na-
tional self-determination and individual freedom. Given their social sta-
tus, it is not surprising that they failed to emphasize the individual's right
to basic human needs.4
A second major force behind the constitutional revolution was Ira-
nian merchants. They were stirred to revolution by the willingness of the
Qajar shahs, rulers of the previous dynasty, to grant enormous economic
concessions to foreign financial interests and by the lack of governmental
interest in creating conditions in which trade and commerce could flour-
ish. Hence, their concern for the rights of national self-determination was
I E. G. BROWNE, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION: 1905-1909, (2d ed. 1966). This book will
give the reader a general account of the revolution.
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highly congruent with self-interest. Their primary emphasis, naturally,.
was in the area of right to property and associated concerns with en-
trepreneurial, commercial and financial freedoms.
The third element, the only one with a substantial mass following,
consisted of religious leaders who advocated a revitalized Islam. Far more
than their allies, the religious leaders were sensitive to the basic human
needs of the Iranian masses. They believed the eclipse of Islam by Chris-
tian imperialists must be a temporary phenomenon and that Islam could
serve as the moral guide in a rapidly changing world. Their concern in the
rights area is embraced by the term, social justice, which they saw as cen-
\tral to the teachings of Mohammad. They were far less interested in indi-
vidual rights and freedom per se and valued tolerance far less than their
secular intellectual allies.5
These internal differences were profound. Basic disagreements quick-
ly surfaced whenever the revolutionary allies achieved or were close to
achieving power. This first manifestation of the Iranian revolution suf-
fered defeat at the hands of foreign powers, one of which, Great Britain,
professed to value the liberalism, humanism and nationalism that gave
color to the Iranian movement in the first instance. Why then, did the
British along with the Russians turn on this movement? The answer, to
that question provides much of the basis for an understanding of twenti-
eth century Iranian history, including the revolution of 1979.
The key is to be found in Iran's strategic geographical position. In
the nineteenth century, Iran and Afghanistan occupied the meeting point
of Russian and British imperialism. Russia moved steadily south and east
through the Caucasus and across the Central Asian steppes, while Britain
consolidated its hold on the Indian sub-continent. Neither power wanted
to pay the price-in terms of costs of occupation and risk of war-of oc-
cupying Iran. Yet, neither wished to allow the other preeminence in Iran.
There followed decades in which the Russians and British competed for
commercial concessions and political influence in Iran. Iranian govern-
ments under the traditional-minded Qajars exploited the situation by
pursuing a policy of "negative balance"-never allowing either power
clear predominance and exacting a high price for each political or com-
mercial concession. The result was an equilibrium that was expensive and
uncomfortable for both Russia and Britain, but still preferable to war.6
At first, neither Britain nor Russian regarded the revolutionary
For a general understanding of the religious role in the revolutionary period see H.
ALGAR, RELIGION AND STATE IN IAN, 1785-1906, (1969); H. ALGAR, MRZA MALKOM KHAN: A
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IRANIAN MODERNISM (Berkeley, 1973); N. KEDDME, RELIGION AND
REBELLION IN IRAN (London, 1966).
6 See F. KAZEMZADEH, RussIA AND BarrAIN IN PERsIA 1864-1914, (1st ed. 1968).
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movement in Iran as a serious threat.7 Despite its initial success the Brit-
ish viewed it in a benignly patronizing way.' Within a year, however, both
Britain and Russia recognized the Iranian constitutional movement as
dangerously destabilizing. The constitutionalists, as Iranian nationalists,
could not play the negative balance game with the ease of the Qajar
shahs. Furthermore, the situation in Iran under the new political leaders
quickly grew chaotic. Even under the best of circumstances, this essen-
tially modernist elite would have required a great deal of time to learn
how to handle an overwhelmingly traditional society. Probably no more
than one or two percent of the population really understood the nature or
implications of the political changes in their country. Had the populace
understood the true import of the situation the constitutionalists would
probably have had to retreat from their early goals to survive politically.
But they were never tested.
Both Britain and Russia, particularly the latter, feared that the
chaos in the country would be used by the other to gain control of Iran.
Therefore they cooperated to restore the traditional Iranian elite to power
in Iran. To justify this action, however, the British had to depict the con-
stitutionalists in such a way that intervention appeared as a morally ac-
ceptable course of action.9 Consequently, the constitutional leaders were
dismissed as self-serving, irresponsible agitators, and the philosophical
underlay of the movement was either ignored or scorned as premature.
By constructing this picture the British circumvented the charge that
they intervened against a movement which supported the full range of
human rights.
B. 1921 and 1953
This basic pattern prevailed throughout the twentieth century and is
clearly evident today, although some major variations occurred which
should be noted. The first of these took form in 1921. At the close of
World War I, the Russian Empire, now the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, was far too weak internally to play a major imperial role in Iran.
Taking advantage of its temporary absence, the British attempted to in-
stitutionalize an inexpensive tutorial control of Iran in the form of the
Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1920.10 These efforts were a functional recog-
nition of the fact that the old traditional order in Iran could no longer
7British State Papers 1909, Persia No. 1, at 4, 5, (Feb. 27, 1907).
$ British State Papers 1909, Persia No. 1 (Feb. 27, 1907) (statement by Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice).
9 This attitude is apparent in British diplomatic correspondence from 1908 on. See
British State Papers 1909, Persia No. 2, at 100.
10 For an Iranian view of this agreement, see N. FATEMI, OIL DILoMAcY: POWDERKEG IN
IRA (1954).
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exercise the control necessary for internal stability. The British plan
amounted to a scheme for gradual economic and administrative moderni-
zation sufficient to provide the desired stability. But the revolutionary
element was strong enough to prevent ratification of the agreement. At
this point, the British organized and directed a coup d'etat intended to
bring into power men capable of maintaining control.1 It was through
this coup that Reza Khan began his climb to absolute power in Iran as
Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah was willing to
modernize and he did so with a ruthless disregard for human rights in
any of its manifestations."2 He provided the stability that the British and
the Soviet Union wanted. The fact that his lack of concern for political
and individual rights was matched by a lack of interest in the material
needs of the poorest of his people appears to have bothered Britain not at
all. It was only when Iran was needed as a part of the Allied war effort
that the British discovered Reza Shah was a tyrant, an ally of the Nazis
and deserving of being overthrowns--an act they and the Soviets
promptly executed by invading Iran in 1941. The first notable variant
from the historical pattern was the recognition by the external powers
that in order to provide the desired stability in Iran, they had to forego
working with an acquiescent, but inefficient traditional elite and turn to
an alliance with a more efficient, albeit obstreperous, authoritarian mod-
ernizer-and one incidentally concerned very little with human rights.
After the last occupation troops left Iran in 1946, control was once
again in the hands of the traditional elite. (The young Shah, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, would not beome Iran's absolute ruler for almost a decade.)
Once again, that elite proved incapable of exercising effective control. At
this point the old revolutionary coalition, led by the venerable Dr. Mo-
hammad Mossadeq, was not to be denied. In 1951 Dr. Mossadeq became
Prime Minister and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized. As
in 1906, the movement reflected primarily the views of the liberal nation-
alists and secular arm of the coalition. Aside from the growing personal
popularity of Mossadeq, however, religious leaders allied to the move-
ment were responsible for much of the mass support.
The parallel with 1906 was also evidenced by the seeming chaos in
Iran from 1951-53. Each of the two great power competitors viewed this
chaos as threatening to work to the advantage of the other. But there was
now a second major variant; the United States had replaced Great Britain
as the primary western power in this competition, although, in terms of
1 R. ULLMAN, ANGLo-SoviET RELATIONS 1917-1921: THE ANGLO-Soviwr AccoRD, 384-88
(1972).
"' For an objective account of this era, see A. BANANz, THE MODERNIZATION OF IRAN
1921-1941 (1961).
13 R. CoT1'AM, NATIONALISM IN IRAN 195 (1979).
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style and substance of response, there was little to distinguish the Ameri-
cans from the British.
Despite the parallel in external power response, the Iran of 1911 and
the Iran of 1953-the years in which the Iranian revolutionary movement
was pushed from power by foreign intervention-were very different. In
1953 the base of support for Dr. Mossadeq was far greater than the mini-
mal support which the constitutionalists of 1906 had enjoyed.14 There was
at least a fair possibility that Dr. Mossadeq could have remained in power
for some years and that a functioning parliamentary democracy could
have evolved. Admittedly, Mossadeq's policies were not always in tune
with liberal democratic principles. His plebiscite in the summer of 1953
had all the earmarks of authoritarian control. But the press was relatively
free as were parliamentary elections. Dr. Mossadeq with his aristo-
cratic-even Qajar-background did not exhibit the same intensity of
concern for satisfying the basic material needs of his people that he ex-
pressed regarding the right of national self-determination and the right of
individual freedom. Nevertheless, the movement constituted a remarka-
bly positive change in emphasis with regard to human rights. And it was
this regime that the United States government decided to overthrow.1 5
In close parallel with British perceptions in 1911, the Americans re-
sponsible for the overthrow of Mossadeq iewed the Iranian national
movement as a relatively small group of self-serving agitators whose ac-
tivities would lead to Soviet domination of Iran. The end result would
only be totalitarian control and the narrowest range for the exercise of
human rights. Consequently, there was little difficulty in reconciling a
traditional American concern for human rights with the overthrow of the
Mossadeq regime. In 1953, as in 1911, the same comfortable argument
was accepted: lacking any tradition of freedom, the Iranians could move
only gradually under a benign tutorial-authoritarian order toward the day
in which a free system could operate successfully. 16
C. Royal Absolutism
From 1953 to 1960, the Iranian traditional elite as the primary west-
ern ally in Mossadeq's overthrow, provided the only real societal support
for the dictatorship of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The demands of
this alliance severely limited the Shah in his programmatic choices.1" But
14 N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1953, § 1, at 1, col. 8; R. CorrAM, supra note 13, at 282-83.
16 M.K. SHEEHAN, IRAN: THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES INTEREST AND POLMCS
1941-1954, at 56 (1968). See also A. TULLY, C.I.A., THE INSIDE STORY 82-89 (1962).
1" For the view of one of the primary American actors in this event, see K. ROOSEVELT,
COUNTERCOUP: THE BLOODY STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN (1979).
17 See generally R. CorrAM, supra note 13, at 288-93.
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during this period the Shah successfully constructed a coercive control
instrument loyal to him personally and capable of maintaining order in
the country. By 1960 he was therefore ready to dispense with his tradi-
tional allies and to move in a far more radically modernizing direction.
He called this the White Revolution. It incorporated land reform and
other features which almost all change-oriented Iranians advocated. Al-
though the Shah's regime initially underwent a crisis associated with this
change in support base, the royal dictatorship stabilized. At least on its
face, the regime appeared to be the most politically sound regime in
south Asia until 1977.
Viewed in terms of the full range of human rights concerns, the
Shah's dictatorial regime deserves many negative, but also some positive
marks. Despite the publicity associated with land reform, the Shah's
white revolution placed low priority on satisfaction of the basic needs of
his poorest subjects.1 s Land reform benefited primarily the well-to-do
peasants and agricultural entrepreneurs. Landless and poor peasants were
often compelled to migrate to large urban centers. Wages for unskilled
laborers lagged far behind those of skilled labor and the income distribu-
tion gap steadily broadened. This development was not politically danger-
ous as long as those at the low end of the scale were experiencing some
improvement in their standard of living-which was true in the pre-infla-
tionary period of 1963-1974. After 1974, however, the inflation rate was
often in the thirty-five to fifty percent range and many of the Iranian
poor suffered a real income decline.1 9
In the area of individual freedom and political rights, the regime was
about as repressive as the state of Iranian technology allowed. The coer-
cive system, best known for its internal security and information organi-
zation known by its acronym "SAVAK", was highly effective. It was con-
sidered by most Iranians to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.
Press and speech were tightly controlled and Iran's modern history was
rewritten. The number of political prisoners ranged between 3,500-the
admitted official figure-and 125,000-the top figure given by opposition
leaders.20 Given the nature of the regime, even visits to prisons by inter-
national organizations told little since the government certainly had the
capability to orchestrate a clean visitation. Torture certainly occurred.
Testimony apparently freely given in the 1979 trials, in fact, seems to
confirm some of the worst and least believed reports.2 1
Is Id. at 288.
19 R. GRAHA, IRAN: THE ILLUSION OF PowER (1978).
' The 125,000 figure is impossible to verify. Opposition leaders, if pressed for eviden-
tial support referred to a Le Monde article which I have yet to find.
2'1 See the testimony of the SAVAK agent referred to as "Tehrani" in IRAN VOICE, July
9, 1979, Vol. 1, No. 6.
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No regime can long survive without at least a passive acquiescence by
important societal elements. The Shah could probably accurately claim
that prior to the period of economic distress, most Iranians were in that
category. Moreover, he had positive support ranging from satisfied to en-
thusiastic from three important groups. The enthusiastic support from
security force officers was real enough as their loyalty throughout the cri-
sis proved. The support he received from the other two groups-ranging
from enthusiastic on the part of large entrepreneurs to satisfied on the
part of many members of the governmental and private technocracy-was
particularly significant in its implications, both direct and indirect, for
the issue of human rights in Iran.
Significantly, the rights of women and some minorities were ex-
tended. Whereas women and favored minorities shared with other Irani-
ans the restrictions on individual and political freedom, both groups saw
their rights to equal opportunity much enhanced within these restric-
tions.22 There undoubtedly was, as followers of Khomeini contend, a great
deal of sexual exploitation in the Iran of the 1960's and 1970's. But there
was also a strong movement of women into the professions and into the
financial world.
The minorities that witnessed substantially improved opportunities
were those that could be described as overachievers i.e., the modal indi-
vidual in these minorities was better educated and had a higher income
than the modal Farsi-speaking, Shia Moslem. Most of those involved were
non-Moslem religious minorities; Bahais, Jews, Christians and Zoroastri-
ans. In the early days of his regime, and then again in its final moment,
the Shah persecuted the Bahais for political advantage. 2 But for the
most part, they and members of the other religious minorities enjoyed a
relative improvement in their situation under the Shah's rule. Other mi-
norities, including the Kurds, Turkomen, Arabs, Baluchis and, to some
extent, the Azerbaijanis, were if anything, even more repressed and more
deprived than they had been before.
Also related to the enhancement of human rights was the degree of
entrepreneurial freedom that existed under the royal dictatorship. For
the individual who understood influence patterns and the requirements
for financial manipulation within the system, there was a good deal of
entrepreneurial freedom and respect for property rights under the Shah's
regime.24
The indirect human rights implications of the Shah's strategy of at-
tracting support from the technocracy and large entrepreneurs are of con-
siderably greater importance than the direct implications. The Shah suc-
22 Fallaci, The Shah of Iran, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 1973, at 16.
13 R. Co'rTA, supra note 13.
24 R. GRAHAM, supra note 19.
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ceeded in attracting the functional support-whether enthusiastic or
merely accommodating-of much of the commercial and professional
classes. These were the very groups that supported the Mossadeq move-
ment. To be sure, there remained a strong core opposition to the royal
dictatorship from the liberal, secular intellectuals, but their potential
rank and file support was largely coopted by the regime. However, in the
climactic months of the Iranian revolution, individuals in this category
began to perceive the regime as mortally vulnerable and at that point
moved into the opposition. But that movement occurred too late to re-
store balance and strength to the liberal-intellectual aspect of the revolu-
tionary equation. In human rights terms, this meant that the relative im-
portance placed on tolerance and individual freedom within the
revolutionary movement declined precipitately as compared with the
Mossadeq era.
Domestic economic developments shifted the balance even more
sharply toward the religious revolutionary pole. When high rates of infla-
tion began to plague Iran in 1974 the section of the population that suf-
fered the greatest distress-unskilled workers, blue collar workers, and
the lower middle class generally-was the very section to which the reli-
gious leaders had the greatest and the liberal secular intellectual leaders
the least, access. Throughout 1977 and 1978, the involvement of secular
intellectuals in opposition activities accelerated. Nevertheless, mass in-
volvement within Iran was overwhelmingly associated with religious ele-
ments. Outside Iran, student revolutionaries polarized around young
Moslem organizations and Marxist organizations. Almost nothing was
heard of the Mossadeqist National Front. Indeed, the strong ties estab-
lished by the Freedom Front with Khomeini and other outstanding reli-
gious leaders were the only reason for the post-revolutionary importance
of the non-Marxist intellectual element in Iranian governmental affairs.
The Freedom Front, headed by Mehdi Bazergan, developed directly from
the Mossadeq movement but was more religious and bazaari in orienta-
tion while the National Front consisted mostly of professional and secular
elements. The Shah's regime, because of the control strategy it adopted of
coopting intellectual and professional elements of society, actually weak-
ened the appeal base for values such as the rights of the individual. Al-
though this was inadvertent, it does point to the self-serving and falla-
cious quality of the argument that the Shah's regime was tutelary and
preparing the societal base for a liberal system.
III. CARTER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Given the recent history of United States-Iranian relations, the
1980
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reader should understand the impact on Iran of President Carter's cam-
paign and inaugural statements to the effect that a concern for human
rights was to be a central component of his foreign policy. In 1953, the
United States had played the major role in ousting the Mossadeq govern-
ment which symbolized for most politically attentive Iranians the search
for national dignity and the expression of political and individual rights.
After Mossadeq, the American government gave full and unequivocal
support to the royal dictatorship which was perceived by its opposition as
more American than Iranian and as guilty of violating a broad range of
human rights. The resulting picture was one of a regime guilty of the
most flagrant violations of human rights, and which was both placed and
maintained in power by the American government. Into this picture,
came a new U.S. president announcing to the world that his foreign policy
would be distinguished by its concern for human rights. The impact of his
election upon Iranians who yearned for a free system was little less than
electrifying.
In the early 1970's, the Shah delighted in interviews that allowed him
to express confidence in his control in Iran and his contempt for western
liberal democracy.25 Making concessions to his opposition was clearly the
last thing on his mind. But by 1976, Iran's economic crisis was developing
and the Shah's public tone was beginning to change. He showed clear
signs of attempting to reduce the intensity of internal hostility toward
him. The number of political prisoners was reduced. Open and flagrant
torturing of prisoners ended. Thus, even before Carter's presidency, the
Shah was beginning a move in the direction of greater human rights. But
there is little doubt that even then a factor in the new concern for human
rights was the American Congress. The Shah accelerated his efforts in
this direction when Carter assumed office but the results were not in ac-
cord with expectations. Far from mollifying his opponents, the Shah's
"liberalization" moves encouraged -even more open opposition activities.
Confronted with this response, the Shah reacted occasionally with brutal
repressive measures. Yet, such acts were often followed by more conces-
sions. A pattern developed-concessions followed by isolated repression
followed by concessions. This pattern was interpreted by opponents of
the regime as the policy of a weak, but unalterably brutal, regime at-
tempting to resist the irresistible force of overwhelming popular revul-
sion. As time progressed, this pattern began to seriously erode the image
of the regime's coercive instrument as all-knowing and all-powerful. In
brief, the regime's opponents began to sense its vulnerability.
A different picture was painted by the core opposition to the regime.
Encouraged by Carter's statements, individuals and groups began, at first
25 Fallaci, supra note 22.
Vol. 12:121
HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN
cautiously and then with increasing temerity, to explore the boundaries of
free political activity. Their initial discoveries were encouraging. Even
when the regime did engage in acts of brutal repression, the sporadic and
arbitrary quality of the repressive measures led opposition leaders to ac-
cept the risks of carrying on their activities. As the regime appeared in-
creasingly vulnerable, a ground-swell of public support for the opposition
increased their confidence and willingness to persist in and intensify their
activities.
The extent to which Carter's human rights policy was, in fact, re-
sponsible for the developing momentum toward disintegration of the
Shah's regime can never be evaluated satisfactorily. Undoubtedly both
the Shah and ,the opposition were responding in early 1977 to the Carter
policy. But by the summer of 1977, signals from the Carter administra-
tion regarding Iran were strong and clear. An ambassador perceived as
sympathetic to the Shah was appointed, the Shah's most ambitious arms
requests were supported, and the administration neither encouraged nor
even took note of an opposition in Iran which was responding directly
and explicitly to Carter's human rights appeal. It is difficult to believe
these signals were missed. Tehran was included in Carter's December
1977 goodwill trip which also took him to Poland, India and Saudi Ara-
bia. Before Carter's departure, a group of Iranians inside the country who
constituted a who's who of the non-Marxist opposition, wrote a statement
describing the state of human rights in Iran. The statement was to be
published in Iran just days before the trip. The Carter administration was
informed well in advance that this group was acting in direct response to
Carter's own program and that a failure to take note of the statement
would result in almost certain punishment of the signatories.2 6 The ad-
ministration did not attempt to dissuade the dissidents from taking the
risk. When Carter arrived in Tehran he described Iran as an island of
stability and the Shah as a broadly popular figure. Acts of violence
against and persecution of the signatories followed as predicted. Then on
September 8, 1978, a day of infamy in Iran known as Black Friday, on
which as many as 4,500 unarmed demonstrators were shot to death,
Carter took time out from his Camp David discussions to telephone and
assure the Shah of continuing American support. As far as the opposition
was concerned, there was no longer any ambivalence in their view of
Carter-they saw him as a total hypocrite in the area of human rights.2"
Yet it is conceivable that, despite the show of American support, the
Shah's pattern of response was in part motivated by a desire to please
26 Several channels were reportedly used by the Iranians. Since I personally gave copies
to members of the Carter administration, I know there was at least one channel.
11 Kayhan International, Jan. 7, 1978.
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Carter. If so, he was obviously misreading American policy, in which case
the American role in inducing his self-defeating response pattern may
have been decisive even if unintended.
In any event, Carter's human rights policy as applied to Iran was a
doctrine without a strategy. The concern for human rights in Iran was
purely abstract. In programmatic development, Carter's policy toward
Iran, like that of his immediate predecessors, was one of total and une-
quivocal support for the Shah's government. Human rights was at most
only a distant, hardly discernable counterpoint to the main theme. Inno-
cent of any understanding of the historical context of Iranian-American
relations, especially as perceived by Iranians, Carter could not know that
his advocacy of human rights might destabilize a close ally. Nor have his
actions reflected an understanding that his enthusiasm for a regime which
stood in the forefront of any list of violators of human rights would ex-
pose him and the United States to the. charge of self-serving hypocrisy.
By virtue of the emphasis he placed on the subject of human rights
as a central concern of American foreign policy, President Carter took the
center stage for advancement of human rights in the world. The Iranian
case suggests this was a mistake. The apparent American, and earlier
British, preference for Iranian regimes that violated human rights is too
strongly supported by historical evidence to be ignored. Because of its
politico-economic strategic position, Iran has been of exceptional impor-
tance in the contemporary great power conflict. And the great powers
have shown every sign of preferring the stability which authoritarian or
totalitarian regimes can provide. As Iranian history suggests, regimes
more sensitive to human rights have tended to be chaotic, and chaos in so
strategically vital an area is interpreted by the governments of competing
great powers as threatening vital national interests. To expect that a con-
cern for human rights could offset concerns for vital economic and secur-
ity interests is to expect the impossible. Governments' foreign policies re-
flect the relative importance assigned to various interests; and evidence
suggests that human rights are a central concern only if there are few or
no economic or strategic interests of overriding importance. Indeed, when
human rights are stressed today it is usually as a tactical manifestation of
some more vital strategic interest. Pointing to Soviet violation of human
rights, for example, is an exercise likely to be indulged in most enthusias-
tically by the very elements in the American government that were most
protective of the Shah.
IV. NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGIES
The Iranian case suggests that governments should be the targets,
rather than the authors, of a human rights strategy. Evidence is strong
that Carter's concern with human rights in his foreign policy was mis-
perceived by Iranian advocates of human rights and by the Shah. By
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grossly overestimating Carter's ability to translate his abstract concern
for human rights into a strategic and tactical program, Iranians respon-
sive to his appeal engaged in activities that resulted in their persecution.
The Shah, also overestimating the functional importance of Carter's
human rights rhetoric, followed a policy that added to an already devel-
oping political destabilization of his regime-a development that policy-
makers concerned with American economic and security interests de-
plored. Had U.S. government policies concerning human rights in Iran
originated in response to strong public pressures reflected through the
press and through Congress, it is far less likely that they would have been
so badly misperceived. The fact is, however, that the administration was
under far too little pressure from the public concerning policy toward
Iran to pay any attention to it. The American public by and large ac-
cepted a progressive and benign stereotypical representation of the royal
dictatorship of Iran. So firmly held was that picture in fact that the full
drama of the revolution in Iran was not appreciated. A totalitarian regime
protected by an elaborately equipped and extravagantly indulged security
force fell victim to a massive and essentially non-violent public uprising.
The congruence of the popularly held stereotype and national interests is
all too obvious.
Was it possible for private organizations to inform the American
public about the state of human rights in Iran? And is there any institu-
tional base for planning and directing a strategy for advancing human
rights abroad?
Organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Com-
mission of Jurists and the International League for Human Rights were
established to provide information but are determined to stay out of the
area of internal politics. The case of Iran suggests such a separation of
information-gathering and political action is both self-deceptive and un-
attainable. The purpose of gaining information on the state of human
rights is ultimately interventionist.
Amnesty International was carefully professional in assessing the
state of human rights in Iran. Indeed, it was so demanding of hard evi-
dence of torture and of the number of political prisoners -that it set stan-
dards concerning information that a covert opposition could scarcely
meet. Nevertheless, Amnesty International became the target of a vicious
attack by the Shah's regime which sought to discredit it.2 8 This was an
understandable response in the critical 1977-78 peiod during which the
Shah's survival in office required strong external support.
However the Shah and his government were solicitous of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists and in particular of Mr. William Butler. The
" See Kayhan International throughout 1977 and the first'half of 1978 for repeated
attacks on Amnesty International.
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Shah chose to confer with Mr. Butler concerning some moves in the di-
rection of eliminating arbitrariness in legal procedures. Not surprisingly,
the opposition saw this as an effort of the Shah's regime to coopt the
International Commission of Jurists.2
9
Most interesting of all were the relations between the Iranian Com-
mittee for Human Rights and Liberty and the International League for
Human Rights. The Iranian Committee became an affiliate of the Inter-
national League. In reality, the Iranian Committee was a coalition of op-
position leaders including associates of Khomeini and representatives of
the National Front. Mehdi Bazergan, its chairperson, was to become the
first prime minister of the revolutionary government. Ibrahim Yazdi, the
committee representative in the United States, was to become foreign
minister. Other members of the Committee entered the Bazergan cabinet
while still others became leaders of the opposition National Democratic
Front. Thus, while there is no reason to believe that the International
League for Human Rights played any direct role in the Iranian revolu-
tion, its affiliate was in fact nothing less than the revolutionary high com-
mand. After the revolution the Committee remained in existence and has
continued to courageously criticize violations of human rights by the rev-
olutionary courts and committees.
The moral here, it seems to me, is not that these organizations should
have been more adept at remaining out of internal politics, but rather
that they should frankly accept the implicit interventionist nature of
their work. What is needed is a strategy for advancing the state of human
rights here and abroad that emanates from the private sector.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REVOLUTION
The vanguard of the Iranian revolution was composed of the same
three historic elements that have been struggling for independence and
change throughout the last century: clerical leaders, bazaar merchants
and secular intellectuals. The difference this time, as noted earlier, was
the clear preeminence of the religious element and the Marxist element
among the younger secular intellectuals. Viewed in terms of their posi-
tions on human rights, the clerical leaders and the younger secular intel-
lectuals emphasized their concern for the dignity and the material needs
of the populace. Other liberal intellectuals and many merchants were
more concerned with tolerance and individual and political freedom.
29 The report of the Int'l Comm'n. of Jurists is, in fact, unconvincingly mild in its criti-
cisms of the state of rule of law in the Shah's Iran. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, HuMAN
RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN IRAN (Geneva, 1976).
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These differing emphases have precipitated serious tension and conflict
among the various groups.
Former Prime Minister Bazergan publicly stated on more than one
occasion that the revolution occurred too fast.30 Moreover, he made it
clear that he was not a revolutionary. In contrast with Bazergan, the in-
tellectual left and the present leadership, the religious associates of
Khomeini are avowedly revolutionary. While Bazergan tried to preserve
the technocracy of the previous regime and adapt the institutions of gov-
ernment to some significantly altered priorites including a concern for in-
dividual freedom, the religious and leftist revolutionaries of the Knomeini
regime advocated a fundamental transformation of the institutions and a
purge of the technocracy in order to seriously address the needs of the
Iranian people.
Central to the direction of future developments is the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini. Both in statement and in action he has made abun-
dantly clear his own preferences between the two foci. Khomeini is a rev-
olutionary. For him social justice requires the elimination of human suf-
fering, the rejection of a preoccupation with materialism, and an end to
the tyrannizing of a people by its government. He pursues these goals,
however, within his own Islamic perspective-a perspective which incor-
porates a belief in the immanence of God and Satan. There is no toler-
ance and little mercy for those who have chosen the path of Satan or that
of "corruption on earth" and for Khomeini there is little difficulty in de-
termining who has followed that path. No elaborately formulated rules of
law are required. Individual freedom thus is sharply limited and political
freedom has meaning only in the sense that it conforms with the needs of
an Islamic ideology. As he is the first to proclaim, Khomeini is far re-
moved from the enlightenment tradition. Executions of individuals
charged with following the path of Satan or indulging in corruption on
earth, following trials in which the accused is denied the right of counsel,
are easily justified in terms of this ideology. Similarly justified are edicts,
handed down by those officially entitled to interpret the Koran on mat-
ters of public moral norms, including even the right to listen to music.
The Khomeini government includes some strong advocates of the full
range of human rights. One such figure is President Ahol-Harran Bani
Sadr. But the Khomeini entourage embraces, as well, individuals with all
the tolerance of diversity of a grand inquisitor. If Khomeini is satisfied
that an official is a true Moslem who seeks to give programmatic expres-
sion to Islamic ideology, Khomeini apparently is willing to grant that in-
dividual strong support. When the inevitable personal and philosophical
disputes develop within his entourage, Khomeini appears to be incapable
30 FBIS, July 6, 1979, Vo. V. No. 131 and July 6, 1979, Vol. V., No. 132 (Speech by
Bazergan).
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of choosing a direction to follow. The result is drift, instability, inconsis-
tency, and uncertainty of outcome. Khomeini apparently is decisive only
in dealing with those he sees as enemies of Islam. Can or should non-
Iranian advocates of human rights play any role in the ultimate outcome?
For Americans in particular, the strategic and tactical options are
limited. It was, after all, the American government that, in implicit viola-
tion of the right of national self-determination, played a major role in
imposing a regime on Iran that violated a wide range of human rights.
Consider in this regard, the April, 1979 Senate resolution condemning the
trials and executions in Iran. For a body that had retained a benign si-
lence throughout the repressive era of the Shah, and in particular had not
expressed unease at the killing of unarmed civilians in Iran in the last
fifteen months of the Shah's rule-a number Iranians believe to be be-
tween 65,000 and 70,000-the resolution was audacious, to say the least.
It was viewed in Iran as an act of arrogantly hypocritical self-righteous-
ness. Its impact was to weaken the element of the revolutionary coalition
most anxious to restore normal relations with the United States-the
very element which was openly opposing the executions in Iran. Amnesty
International and the International League for Human Rights, with their
consistent records and international membership, can criticize violations
of human rights in Iran with positive effect. But few Americans, individu-
als, or other organizations can do so. The current hostage situation only
underscores U.S. impotence in this regard.
The past century of western relations with Iran suggests a more ap-
propriate target for a human rights strategy for Americans concerned
with Iran. As described above, each time the present coalition of elements
came into power, a chaotic readjustment period followed. Historically,
British, and later American, decision-makers concerned with Iran inter-
vened against the revolutionary movement or government to prevent the
Russians from taking advantage of the situation. By doing so they im-
posed regimes on Iran which had little concern for human rights. Ameri-
can human rights advocates should learn from this historical experience.
Their target should be their own people and government. And their ob-
jective should be (1) to put the human rights picture in Iran into perspec-
tive; and (2) to oppose the inevitable tendency of American-decision mak-
ers to think in terms of an interventionist solution.
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